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ABSTRACT:   This  paper  discusses 
the need for macroeconomic policy 
coordination in the E(M)U. Coordination 
of national policies with cross-border 
effects does not exist at the macroeconomic 
level, although requested by the EU 
Treaty. The need for coordination stems 
from current account imbalances, which 
origin in market-induced capital flows, 
destabilizing the real exchange rates 
between low and high wage countries. The 
recent attempts of the Commission and 
the European Council to reform E(M)U 
governance do not address this problem 
and thus remain incapable to protect 
against future instability. Macroeconomic 
coordination needs (i) a clear identification 
of union-wide employment goals, and (ii) 
the establishment of a high level institution 
responsible for coordination following 
these objectives. The paper proposes a 
High Representative for Economic Policy, 
equipped with an appropriate office and 
supported by a Council of Economic 
Advisers committed to the union-wide 
objectives.
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1.   MARKET-InDUCED CAPITAl flOWS ARE RESPOnSIBlE  
fOR EU-WIDE IMBAlAnCES
According to Article 121 of the EU Treaty on the Functioning of the EU, member 
states of the Union shall coordinate their economic policies within the Council 
of Ministers. There is no written exception, but in fact national fiscal or income 
policies with their spillovers on union-wide employment, inflation, or fiscal 
stability are not subject to coordination.1 What Europe has seen in joint policy 
actions in 2010 and 2011 was ad hoc coordination forced by the mushrooming 
public debt crisis, first through the temporary European Financial Stabilisation 
Facility (EFSF) and the European Financial Stability Mechanism (EFSM) in May 
and October 2010, to be succeeded by the permanent European Stabilization 
Mechanism (ESM) for the bail-out of insolvent EMU governments from 2013 
onwards. The focus in this paper is on recent attempts to overcome the basic 
deficiency in treaty realization, which is the lack of policy institutions, not for 
bailouts but for crisis prevention. Up until now these attempts exist as proposals 
such as the Commission’s 2020 agenda (early 2010), its ‘six pack’ proposal for 
surveillance and imposition of an excessive imbalance procedure (late 2010), and 
the European Council’s Euro-Plus Pact (March 2011).2 
The paper tries to answer the question of whether the attempts at permanent 
crisis prevention have set the EU on the right track towards effective and regular 
macroeconomic policy coordination. I am going to judge the reforms from a 
macroeconomic perspective. This is distinct from the discussion dominated by 
the institutional economic perspective, which compares the transaction costs 
and benefits of various solutions but tends to disregard or to remain empirically 
inconclusive with respect to real economic costs like unemployment or inflation 
(for an overview see Grusevaja and Pusch, 2011; and as an example see Hodson, 
2009). 
The second section of this paper will argue that financial market-induced capital 
flows in a non-optimum currency area tend to revalue the real exchange rate 
of poor countries and cause external and internal imbalances. The evidence for 
this is provided in section 3, and is also distinct from approaches that explain 
imbalances as policy-induced (for example, Laski and Podkaminer (2011) blame 
the monetary policy of the ECB). Both my basic economic argument and the 
1  Compared to micro reform attempts (social insurance, labour market institutions, education, 
etc.).
2  Also called Pact for Competitiveness and Pact for the Euro. EU GOVERNANCE REFORM
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evidence provided call for regular coordination based on symmetric policy 
actions, targeted at common rather than national employment and stability 
objectives. Institutional perspectives complete the picture in section 4, which 
summarizes the deficiencies of the EU governance system, above all the Stability 
and Growth Pact (SGP) and the Excessive Deficit Procedure (EDP). I argue that 
their asymmetric approach deepens the imbalances between countries, and offers 
opportunities to national fiscal and income policies to reinforce the market-
induced results by policy-induced real devaluation and forced revaluation. In 
section 5 the above-mentioned reform attempts are critically evaluated. Section 6 
concludes and presents the proposal for the institution of a High Representative for 
Economic Policy, hopefully capable of overcoming the dead end in coordination. 
2.   ThE hISTORY Of EUROPEAn MOnETARY COOPERATIOn:  
fROM SYMMETRIC TO ASYMMETRIC ADjUSTMEnT
The recent hot debate on reform of the E(M)U governance system among 
European politicians and economists has been induced by the sovereign debt 
crisis in the Euro area. The debt crisis itself arose from the banking and financial 
crisis when all EU governments were engaged in rescuing banks and collected 
less tax revenues due to a decline in economic activity. However, in countries 
like Greece, Spain, Portugal, Ireland, and Italy, the accumulation of high debt 
positions in the private sector in the ten-year pre-crisis period went hand in 
hand with persistent current account deficits and capital inflows, while the 
counterpart countries accumulated credit positions through current account 
surplus and capital exports. This balance-of-payments link brings us to the issue 
of competitiveness and the real exchange rate. Capital inflows, current account 
deficits, and increasing private and then public debt find their common origin in 
the deterioration of the real exchange rate, or in other words in a real revaluation 
in debtor countries and a corresponding devaluation in creditor countries. 
The issue of establishing mechanisms effective in stabilizing real exchange rates 
is a well-known problem in a world with different currencies. The issue is closely 
related to the impact of capital flows on a country’s competitiveness in goods 
markets, hence on current account positions, private debt, and employment 
in the global perspective. Countries with high inflation need a devaluation to 
restore their competitiveness in goods markets, while countries with low inflation 
need a revaluation. However, with free capital flows currency markets produce 
quite the opposite result. Higher interest rates in countries with relatively high 
inflation lure short-term capital inflows to draw gains from arbitrage, which 72
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lead to an appreciation of the exchange rate, and vice versa. Hence the need for 
symmetric action of capital exporting and importing countries. The issue was 
hotly debated before and at the Bretton Woods conference in 1944. In 1942 
Keynes had already proposed a clearing union when thinking about a new world 
economic order after the devastating experiences of the period between world 
wars. “The Clearing Union must also seek to discourage creditor countries from 
leaving unused large liquid balances which ought to be devoted to some positive 
purpose. For excessive credit balances necessarily create excessive debit balances 
for some other party. In recognizing that the creditor as well as the debtor may 
be responsible for a want of balance, the proposed institution would be breaking 
new ground”. (Horsefield, 1969: 20). 
The Bretton Woods system of fixed exchange rates failed due to its ignoring 
destabilizing capital flows. Its Asian survivor (exchange rates pegged to the US 
dollar) followed, to collapse in the 1997 crises. Currency carry trades have been 
a well-known phenomenon since the early 1980s when financial institutions 
invested heavily in the Yen in Asian emerging markets, or recently when investors 
engaged short-term in Swiss Franc lending to Eastern European countries with 
flexible exchange rates (Gyntelberg and Remolona, 2007; Galata et al., 2007). The 
inflows of capital lead to a revaluation of flexible exchange in the high-inflation 
countries that is against the fundamentals, which demand devaluation. These 
experiences are the background to proposals to return to a global system of 
managed flexible exchange rates with symmetric interventions (‘re-alignments’) 
to ensure stable real exchange rates and sustainable current-account positions 
completed by effective macroeconomic coordination (see, for example, UNCTAD, 
2009, p. 127; see also the US proposal for indicative guidelines at the G20 summit, 
November 2010). 
With the European Monetary System (EMS) Europe returned to a system of 
managed exchange rate flexibility. Between 1979 and 1998 a change of the central 
parities in a bilateral relationship had to be agreed on a multilateral basis in a 
symmetric way: a simultaneous devaluation of one currency was completed by 
the revaluation of one or more other currencies.3 Hence, the burden to adjust was 
symmetrically distributed between the involved countries. Although fragile and 
needing frequent adjustments, the EMS was quite successful in stabilizing the 
real exchange rates. One of these adjustments, the Basle-Nyborg agreement of 
1989, completed the EMS exchange rate mechanism with a closer monitoring of 
monetary developments in the participating countries. The introduction of the 
3  Symmetry did not mean that the extent of both changes were the same. EU GOVERNANCE REFORM
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common currency and the single monetary policy of the European Central Bank 
(ECB) substituted for symmetric adjustments and installed a fiscal monitoring 
with the asymmetric provisions of the Stability and Growth Pact (SGP) and the 
Excessive Deficit Procedure (EDP); only countries with excessive deficits had to 
adjust. 
The single currency eliminates nominal exchange rate fluctuations but it fails to 
install a system of stable real exchange rates measured in terms of relative unit 
labour cost (ULC) or other terms.4 Arbitrage on short-term financial markets 
(money and currency markets) is no longer possible, but the deviation of real 
exchange rates from fundamentals like productivity evolves directly through the 
other financial markets, and thus the cause-effect relationship is different to a 
multi-currency system with flexible exchange rates: the trigger of instability is 
the erosion of risk premiums which allows for expropriating the specific benefits 
of countries with relatively low wage costs. Massive capital flows from countries 
with higher wage costs into low-cost countries contribute to higher inflation in 
the latter. Nominal upward wage adjustments follow higher inflation and lead to 
the de-coupling of productivity and wages and to an increase in relative ULC; 
this is the real appreciation effect for the low-cost country. Quite the opposite 
would be necessary to meet with fundamentals and to ensure competitiveness in 
goods markets: capital importing countries with low wage costs need devaluation 
while capital exporting countries with high wage costs need an appreciation of 
their real exchange rate. This wage convergence process must come to an end 
when wage levels are equalized; however, the process will collapse earlier when 
private debt becomes unsustainable – as well as the asset position of the lending 
country. 
The erosion of risk premiums that makes the problem of stabilizing the real 
exchange rate in a currency union different from a multi-currency system is not 
only or even predominantly a result of the vanishing exchange rate risk. It is the 
result of ignorance of existing country-specific investment risks. The problem is 
known as ‘risk sharing’, which goes back to Mundell’s (1973) and MacKinnon’s 
(2006) contributions to the theory of optimum currency areas. The full stock of 
financial assets of lenders in a country A against a borrowing country B could 
be exercised as a claim on the resources of all the other countries, C, D, or E, 
should B be hit by a sudden decrease in output or a wage shock. Risk sharing 
was originally understood as distributing shocks more symmetrically among the 
4  Other measures of real exchange rates exist; for example, the ratio between prices of tradable 
and non-tradable goods.74
Economic Annals, Volume LVI, No. 191 / October – December 2011
members of a currency union. Mundell (1973) judged the effect as strong enough 
to compensate for all traditional deficiencies of a currency union (divergences in 
structure, priorities, lack of labour mobility, etc.), which made him benevolent 
towards the common currency project in Europe. However, the distribution of 
Greek and other countries’ risks after the crisis was a fiasco. Risk sharing supports 
moral hazard in the financial industry. 
There is no market mechanism in a currency area to get the prices right. Even 
if the common currency and single monetary policy increase the demand for 
nominal wage flexibility and lead to a convergence of labour market institutions 
(the endogeneity argument; see Calmfors, 2001, p. 2), they do not prevent the 
emergence of real exchange rate instability. Assume that the typical national wage 
function with national inflation and productivity increase as variables in high-
wage as well as low-wage countries: in the high-wage country capital outflows 
will suppress national inflation, nominal wages will follow the lower inflation 
path, and ULC will decline; while in the low-wage country with capital inflows 
ULC will increase due to higher inflation (we assume productivity increases in 
both countries as given). Hence, the need for wage adjustment is a symmetric 
one: nominal wages in high-wage countries need to be above and nominal wages 
in low-wage countries need to be below the inflation rate. This was the effect 
of the re-alignment procedure in the old EMS: the revaluation of the currency 
meant a relative increase of the labour costs in the surplus country, and vice versa. 
The symmetry argument becomes even more visible if national wage formation 
follows the average inflation rate of the currency area (or the inflation target of 
the central bank). Only, in this case, the stability of real exchange rates can be 
maintained, as well as the stability of the common currency. In the absence of the 
Balassa-Samuelson effect,5 national monetary conditions would converge.6
3.   fACTS fOR ThE EMU: InflATIOn AnD WAGE InCREASES  
fOllOW CAPITAl InflOWS
Is there sufficient evidence for this theory? Figure 1 illustrates the nominal 
compensation per employee7 in euros of the five countries with the lowest wage 
level (Greece, Portugal, Spain, Italy, and Ireland) compared to the unweighted 
5  The effect seems to be weak (see Lommatzsch and Tober, 2006, also for an overview on the 
empirical literature for the EU). 
6  This is the argumentation of the minority position in the German Council of Economic 
Advisers (Sachverständigenrat, (2005, p. 729. 
7  The indicator includes social taxes and non-contractual wages. EU GOVERNANCE REFORM
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average of the five high-wage countries (Austria, Belgium, Germany, France, the 
Netherlands). There is a very strong increase of nominal compensation in Greece 
and Ireland, and a less pronounced ‘convergence’ in the case of the other three 
countries. The decline of risk premiums is shown in Figure 2 in terms of the risk 
premium on ten-year sovereign bonds. We see a sharp decline for Greece, Italy, 
Ireland, Portugal, and Spain since the mid-1990s (Euro preparation stage) – all 
countries, except Italy, with relatively low wage costs at that time.
Figure 1:    Wage differences - nominal compensation per employee in euros 
(unweighted average of 5 high-wage countries = 100)a
a Austria, Belgium, Germany, France, and the Netherlands. 
Source: European Commission Economic and Financial Affairs (2011), own calculation and 
presentation. 76
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Figure 2:    The decline of sovereign bond risk premium (government 10 year 
bond yields against German government bond yields) for Greece, 
Portugal, Spain, Ireland, and Italy, 1990 - 2011
Source:  IMF, 2011. 
Figure 3 depicts the widening differences in price levels in terms of cumulated 
differences in the Harmonized Consumer Price Index (HCPI). Greece, Spain, 
Portugal, Ireland, and Italy belong to the countries with the highest levels 
accumulated over time, while Germany, Finland, Austria, and France report the 
lowest levels.EU GOVERNANCE REFORM
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Figure 3: HCPIa (1995=100) of selected Euro area members
a Harmonised Consumer Price Index. 
Sources:  European Commission Economic and Financial Affairs (2011), author’s calculations.
In Figure 4 the index of unit labour costs illustrates that Germany, Austria, and 
Finland show a path below the euro area average, while southern members (plus 
Ireland) are above (for a similar picture, see European Commission, 2004). If, 
for example, wages in Germany had followed the average E(M)U inflation rate 
instead of the lower rate, German ULC would not have deviated so much from 
the average ULC in the EU. 
A test of Granger causality with stacked data for E(M)U member countries 
reveals that inflation determines wage costs rather than vice versa (Table 1). 
This causality is in line with the theory of monetary integration where regional 
inflation pressure can be caused only by relatively high capital imports, while 
in an economy with its own currency wage increases over productivity induce 
inflation if the central bank or the domestic banking sector accommodates. 78
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Figure 4:    Unit labour costa index (1995 = 100) of the euro area members, 
relative to the weighted average
a Nominal compensation per employee to real GDP per employed person
Sources:  European Commission Economic and Financial Affairs (2011), author’s calculations.
Table 1:  Pairwise Granger Causality Tests for stacked EMU member countries
Sample: 1991 2006
Lags: 2; obs.: 240
 Null Hypothesis: Obs F-Statistic Prob. 
 ULC does not Granger Cause inflation  165  1.78470 0.1712
 Inflation does not Granger Cause ULC   10.9237 4.E-05
ULC: annual rate of change of unit labour cost; inflation: annual rate of change of the HCPI.EU GOVERNANCE REFORM
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Figure 5 illustrates the history of trade imbalances. Countries with eroding risk 
premiums, higher inflation, and wage cost increases show growing trade deficits, 
while countries with traditionally low risk premiums, lower inflation, and wage 
cost increases below average show growing trade surpluses. 
Figure 5:  Intra-EU net exports in % of GDP, 1991 - 2005
Sources:  European Commission Economic and Financial Affairs (2011), author’s calculations.
Figure 6 shows the cumulated current account position as a proxy for debt and 
credit positions among EMU countries. There are remarkable shifts in these 
positions quite opposite to the predictions of the inter-temporal balancing 
hypothesis. 
Finally, in Figure 7 we see that those countries with still sustainable budget 
positions in 2006, such as Spain, Ireland (surplus), and Italy and Portugal 
(meeting the 3% deficit criterion of the SGP) run the highest deficits in 2009. This 
is the effect of the private debt crisis, when governments bailed out their national 
banking systems.8 This shifted the attention of political leaders and economists 
from the financial to the fiscal sector: the issue of fiscal inappropriateness 
8  Not to forget the effects of the automatic stabilizers and discretionary measures to stabilize 
effective demand.80
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replaced the issue of financial sector inappropriateness following destabilizing 
capital flows. 
Figure 6:    Cumulated Current Account (CCA) Positions of EMU countries, in 
% of GDP, 1998 and 2009
Source:  OECD, 2011.EU GOVERNANCE REFORM
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Figure 7:  EMU countries: Change in public positions
Source:  OECD, 2011.82
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4. ThE EU GOVERnAnCE SYSTEM fOSTERS ThE nATIOnAl PERSPECTIVE 
Under the assumption that the currency union would work like an engine for 
structural, institutional, and macroeconomic convergence, the transition from 
the EMS to the Euro system abolished any symmetric adjustment mechanism. 
However expectations that labour markets would take over the function of 
the nominal exchange rate were not fulfilled (Buscher and Gabrisch, 2010). 
Rather, cross-border capital flows de-coupled nominal wages from productivity. 
Moreover there is no coordinated fiscal and income policy committed to union-
wide full employment: full employment was and is seen as the result of labour 
market reforms at the national level, for which the single currency and common 
monetary policy should be the driving forces. Nor was effective macroeconomic 
coordination with a clear focus on union-wide employment implemented, 
although articles 119-121 of the treaty on the functioning of the EU clearly stipulate 
that the economic policy of member states is subject to “close coordination” and 
has to be a matter of common interest. Fiscal or income/wage policies are not 
explicitly excluded, but in fact national governments have undertaken many fiscal 
actions that impact on wages and income without consultation at the EU level. 
One criticized attempt at achieving a highly competitive position is the German 
policy of wage moderation (De Grauwe, 2006). 
After the introduction of the common currency and the single monetary policy, 
monetary monitoring (Basle-Nyborg treaty) was replaced by the monitoring of 
fiscal developments together with the provisions of the Stability and Growth 
Pact and the Excessive Deficit Procedure. The solution to the basic problems of 
the currency union, namely unstable real exchange rates and weak growth and 
unemployment at the union level, was not addressed. 
The discussion among leading European economists about the short-comings 
of the SGP and EDP circles around their effectiveness; the problem of real 
permanent real exchange rate changes is disregarded. The governance system 
suffers from asymmetric information between the monitoring authority and the 
individual government (Pisany-Ferry, 2010), leading to moral hazard of the latter 
(Hodson, 2009). Greece is the striking example of failures in the EU statistical 
reporting system. There is an enforcement problem, which the principal-agent 
perspective so nicely reveals: the government as the agent is part of the body of the 
principal – the Council of Ministers. If agents slip into the role of their principal, 
enforcement becomes a joke: sanctions against the most powerful members 
(Germany, France) might not be undertaken. As Buiter (2006, p. 699) observed, 
the “SGP has made a contribution to sustainability only in EU members desiring EU GOVERNANCE REFORM
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to become full members of the EMU”. Fulfilling the Maastricht convergence 
and stability criteria prior to EMU accession does not necessary mean fulfilling 
them later (Gabrisch and Orlowski, 2010). But Buiter (2006, p. 698) raises a 
more important argument in favor of policy coordination: the SGP influences 
and constrains each individual country’s fiscal policy without any reference to 
economic conditions in other countries. Without any coordination mechanisms 
fiscal actions might strengthen the change in the competitive positions induced 
by capital flows. Countries that should revalue their real exchange rate against 
other members of the E(M)U can actually improve their competitive position by 
fiscal action. A striking example is the 2007 hike in the German value added tax 
by 3 percentage points, which increased the prices of imports to Germany and 
worked like a devaluation of the real exchange rate. 
5.   An ATTEMPT AT EffECTIVE REfORM?  
EURO PlUS AnD ThE ExCESSIVE IMBAlAnCE PROCEDURE 
With negative spillovers of fiscal actions in the non-optimum currency area 
without fiscal transfers, effective9 macroeconomic policy coordination is not only 
a necessity but required by the EU treaty. Although the problem of unsustainable 
current account deficits had been discussed among economists before the 
outbreak of the crisis in 2009 (see among others the tests for sustainability by 
Fischer, 2007, and Dullien and Fritzsch, 2007, or Aherne et all, 2007 in connection 
with capital flows from high to low income countries), it was the outbreak of 
the crisis that put the issue back on the political agenda.10 In March 2010 the 
EU Commission published its Europe 2020 strategy, which is the successor to 
the Lisbon agenda for 2010. The Commission argued that policy coordination 
in the EU was successful in limiting the negative impacts of the financial crisis 
on the real economy (European Commission, 2010a: 9), but a closer political 
coordination would be necessary to counter the destabilizing imbalances and 
differences in competitiveness (p. 31). The Commission proposed a system of 
annual surveillance (“European Semester”), including not only the fiscal stances 
but also other important macroeconomic indicators such as external positions. 
However wage formation was not included, although nominal wages deviated 
from productivity growth in almost all countries – either in one or the other 
9  The term ‘effective’ serves to distinguish attempts from weak modes of coordination, like the 
open method of coordination (OMC) in employment and other policies that are based on 
‘naming and shaming’ pressure.
10  It was a big topic prior to EMU in the 1990s; coordination or policy rules. See Pisano-Ferry, 
2006. The author already draws the lines in a pre-crisis debate on EU governance issues. 84
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direction. In September 2010 the Commission proposed six decrees (“Six pack”) 
to be passed by the European Parliament and the European Council in 2011 to 
improve economic governance (European Commission, 2010b). In one of these 
proposals (European Commission, 2010c) the Commission suggests extending 
surveillance of economic policies beyond budgetary surveillance (in the EDP) 
and the introduction of an Excessive Imbalance Procedure (EIP), including a fine 
as the enforcement mechanism. Surveillance would be based on a scoreboard 
of indictors, of which some would have a symmetric character including not 
only unsustainable deficits but also permanent surpluses if too high. This is 
certainly different to the SGP, where only a budgetary deficit (and public debt) is 
considered.11 However the approach suffers from severe analytical shortcomings. 
Firstly, a symmetric approach to current account imbalances contradicts the 
asymmetric approach in the existing SGP and EDP, since both invite competitive 
fiscal policies which deepen trade imbalances. Secondly, the first view progress 
towards more symmetry is strongly diluted by ignorance about the effects of 
cross-border financial investment; we read (p. 4) that “A current account deficit of 
3 % may be considered acceptable in a converging country with strong investment 
needs, but not in a more advanced country with a rapidly ageing population”. 
There is neither striking evidence nor theoretical reasoning that convergence is 
possible only with current account deficits or capital imports. 
At its meeting in March 2011 the European Council set a clear counterpoint to 
the halfhearted attempts of the Commission (European Council, 2011), although 
maintaining the usual Brussels declaration approach by formally accepting all 
former papers and proposals of the Commission. But the Euro Plus Pact of the 
Council intends to preserve the competitive approach to wage and fiscal policies. 
At first glance the pact acknowledges, correctly, that wage increases should occur 
in line with productivity progress (p. 16). However in the same breath it states, on 
ULC, “Large and sustained increases may lead to the erosion of competitiveness, 
especially if combined with a widening current account deficit and declining 
market shares for exports”. So far only an upward and not a downward deviation 
of wage increases from productivity is seen as a problem. Hence, the burden for 
adjustment is put on the deficit country, as before. As long as Europe’s leading 
politicians do not acknowledge that the origins of current account imbalances 
are symmetric, no effective progress in stabilizing the E(M)U can be expected. 
The Euro Plus pact defends the competitive wage policies of some richer EU 
countries, among them some that contributed to emerging current account 
11  In fact the public debt indicator lost its relevance at the very beginning of the monetary 
union. EU GOVERNANCE REFORM
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imbalances. Moreover the Pact clearly repeats the old and dubious position that 
unemployment is made on labour markets (p. 17), ignoring its macroeconomic 
origins. Clearly, inflexible labour markets, not financial markets, are posited as 
the drivers for current account imbalances. Insomuch, employment should be 
increased by labour market reforms and lower taxes on labour – an approach the 
value added tax hike in Germany 2007 would fit perfectly. Finally, the Council 
confirms the role of the existing SGP/EDP asymmetric framework and ignores 
that – in the words of Buiter (2006: 698) – the pact does not “take account of any 
other past, current and anticipated future economic developments in the E(M)U 
area as a whole.”
6. COnClUSIOnS, AnD A PROPOSAl
We have to conclude that the European Council’s latest decisions will not provide 
any effective contribution to overcoming the sovereign debt crisis; nor will it 
protect against future macroeconomic instability. Rather the danger is that an 
inflated macroeconomic reporting system will create a new bureaucracy, stripped 
of any real influence but poring over mountains of documents. What Europe 
needs is a new (contractual) complex of economic policy cooperation that couples 
transparency with the priority of European over national perspectives. National 
economic policies need to include the perspective of employment and financial 
stability in other countries. More effectiveness means coordination in the 
framework of cooperation reaching far beyond the usual ‘naming and shaming’ 
effects on the operative level, as in the open method of coordination. In fact the EU 
has already created a model for such a system in a field where nations are in part 
inclined to defend sovereignty: foreign and security policies. Indeed, European 
policy makers believe more in high-ranked coordination in the less integrated 
third pillar of the EU than in the mostly integrated first pillar. The installation of 
a High Representative would be a model for more cooperation without formally 
reducing national sovereignty in economic policy. A High Representative would 
be a high-ranking institution in the EU pecking order, and would function as 
an interface between the Commission and the European Council. In so doing, it 
would gain sufficient democratic legitimacy for coordinated policy action. As in 
foreign and security policy, the High Representative should be equipped with an 
office for ex-post and ex-ante monitoring and surveillance. The assessment of the 
macroeconomic situation of the entire EU region should be left to an independent 
Council of Economic Advisers, whose opinions and recommendations with 
respect to wage and fiscal policies would create the grounds for the High 
Representative’s coordination attempts. In such an approach sanctions would be 86
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symmetric and not asymmetric, as in the reform proposals recently discussed. 
Such a reform would contribute to making article 121 of the EU Treaty on the 
Functioning of the European Union more binding: “Member States shall regard 
their economic policies as a matter of common concern and shall coordinate 
them within the Council (…)”. 
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